Why do extremists do what they do

A similar model of religious extremism as the culmination of a trajectory of religious identity into group-based violence is put forward by Silber and Bhatt The process of being extreme begins with an openness to new thoughts e.

Within this process, a tragic experience can lead to the loss of meaning and connection with the initial identity e. The adoption of extreme beliefs and norms fuelled by tragedy is enhanced by the indoctrination process operated by an extreme organization.

Again, religious extremism is seen to reach its ultimate end in the expression of violence by the actor. The above conceptual approaches to extremism associate extremism with violence committed as a group member. Other more individual-level analyses of extremism operationalize it as endorsement of particular beliefs, such as the duty to engage in violent holy war against the enemy Webber et al.

Some analyses have spanned both individual and group levels: for example, Schmid proposes that either for individuals i.

Similarly, Hogg and Adelman have defined extremism through the aspects covering group level i. While we applaud the development of more nuanced ways to understand religious extremism, and the diversity of definitions above, we propose that such distinctions do not go far enough in unpacking the multiple ways in which extremism can be expressed. To allow for the development of this diversity, we adopt a broader definition of extremism and define extremism as the extent to which there are clear norms about appropriate behavior and very little latitude in accepting different pattern of norms or particular behaviors.

Thus, the focus is not so much on the behavior itself, but on the extent to which particular behaviors are normatively prescribed within a religious group with little room for deviating from that. Therefore, what is perceived as extreme in one historical or cultural context may be moderate or mainstream in another. This usage is in contrast to the definitions proposed by scholars who have associated extremism exclusively with violent intergroup conflict. In line with Sedgwick , we propose that religion, either at individual or group level, can be expressed along a continuum ranging from moderate to extreme, but go further by arguing that there is not one continuum, but multiple dimensions of religion.

We discuss the implication of embracing extremism in one dimension but not in others, and argue that the specific constellations of moderate vs. To illustrate the multiple dimensions of religious extremism, we focus on the context of Indonesian Muslim groups. We propose that our analysis should also help to understand religious extremism in other faith groups but that the dimensions on which moderate vs.

We are certainly not the first to propose that there are multiple dimensions to religion and that these dimensions uniquely connect to important behaviors, such as life satisfaction, stress, youth deviancy.

Glock and Stark suggested that within all religions, there are five distinct components: ideological beliefs , intellectual knowledge , ritual overt religious behavior , experiential feelings or emotions , and consequential the effect of religiosity in the world. More recently, Saroglou proposed four basic dimensions of religion and individual religiosity that are partially distinct: believing i.

According to these models, and others, the behavioral expression of religion is complex and multi-faceted. We draw on these frameworks to examine religious extremism. Combining insights from these prior models, we propose a multidimensional structure to religion that can help to understand the ways in which moderate vs. We elaborate our four-dimensional model below, but to summarize: our starting point is the literature on violent religious extremism, where the most common dimension identified and often the only dimension considered is the political dimension.

In addition, we were inspired by various religious movements in Indonesia that have different emphasis on their narratives and actions. However, they tend to accept the current political system employed to rule the nation. In contrast, Hizbut Tahrir , a banned organization in Indonesia, proposes that Muslims are responsible to recreate an Islamic empire, by rejecting democratic systems and nation-states; however, Hizbut Tahrir does not typically engage in theological debates.

Therefore, alongside the political dimension, we also consider three other dimensions which emerge in seeking to understand religious extremism in Indonesia.

Some groups have very little latitude in how they understand and practice their religious rituals and justify the other practices as forbidden innovation. Finally, we propose a social dimension that captures the intra- and intergroup relations of the religious group in Indonesia. Before elaborating these dimensions, it is important to note that the four focal dimensions in the present paper do not imply that other dimensions do not exist when explaining religious extremism.

Yet, these four dimensions may become more or less important as a result of particular historical and cultural developments or group comparisons, and this may also mean that other dimensions may need to be considered for other religious groups, and when studying other contexts see also, Zarkasyi, ; Ysseldyk et al.

Below we consider the four dimensions in turn, and identify how the dimensions might be used in research. We address religious extremism and the multiple dimensions of religion in Figure 1. Using a classical standpoint that religion is expressed through multiple dimensions Glock and Stark, ; Saroglou, , we propose to examine a multidimensional religious extremism through separate political, theological, ritual, and social dimensions which may or may not co-vary.

Figure 1. Illustration of the extreme-moderate continuum across a multidimensional representation of religion. The figure illustrates a religious group with high extremism in theological and ritual dimensions but moderate beliefs in the social and political dimensions.

We argue that this exercise enables a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of religious extremism as presented in Table 1. In what follows, we draw attention to the interplay of these different dimensions for different religious groups. We argue that the four dimensions of religious extremism i.

Following our outline of the four dimensions, we discuss a methodology for measuring context-specific religious extremism and discuss research applications.

Table 1. Mapping out the moderate and extreme end points of the four dimensions of religion. The way that religion and politics should relate has been a source of intense debate and struggle throughout history Armstrong, In the psychological literature, the political dimension of religion has not received much attention e.

In this approach, extreme religious movements seek political power, to promote the adoption of their religious norms through laws or force. Contemporary religious extremism in the political dimension for Islam is often associated with support for the Caliphate or Muslim empire, which persisted in various forms from the s to AD, when the last Ottoman Caliphate was abolished in Turkey. During this time, Islam was associated with both a hierarchical, sometimes expansionist, imperial state and a specific system of religious, legal, and cultural practices called sharia law.

More extreme groups advocate a radical agenda in political change e. They believe that political norms should be applied to change the current locally adapted political systems across many Muslim countries. Other, more moderate groups, however, strive for an integration of religious values within the current political systems e. They tend to believe that religion should not be politically represented through the legalization of its social order.

The political dimension is typically the most salient dimension for scholars when discussing Islamic religious extremism, as it is for other groups. More extreme stances on this political dimension such as support for comprehensive sharia , support for the resurrection of the Caliphate, and the rejection of democracy were used by Fealy to identify extremist groups in Indonesia e.

In addition, the extent to which religious groups approve of and participate in current political systems in Indonesia has been used to identify the more moderate Islamic movements in Indonesia e.

It should be noted, however, that religious extremism on the political dimension can manifest in different ways, and that politically extremist groups propose different paths to reconcile the constitution with religious norms. For example, some religious groups propose to promote sharia laws through democratic governance, other groups reject the current political system by actively campaigning for the imposition of sharia without violence; and finally, still other groups are willing to use violence to destabilize the government See Ward, ; Webber et al.

With or without support for violent means of creating change, the advocacy toward comprehensive sharia law as well as the revival of an Islamic empire reflects a radical agenda to transform the current established political system.

In addition to these different views regarding the place of religion in the state, groups of Muslim also differ in their support for democracy e. Some of them reject democracy, believing that democracy as a political system is incompatible with Islam Fealy, ; Ward, , that Islamic instructions about all matters relating to life are clearly articulated in the Quran and Hadith the words, behaviors, and approvals of the prophet.

This view holds that the musyawara political discussions to reach a consensus should only be used for decisions about particular technical matters, not core principles of social functioning Nurhayati, In contrast, some other groups of Muslim do not favor or sanction a particular political system, but rather advocate for principles of tolerance and respect in the governance of all political systems.

In this way, the latter groups perceive democracy as one way to manage national affairs that is not in conflict with Islam Ward, ; Nurhayati, How then do more moderate vs. We propose that for religious groups that are located at the moderate end of the theological dimension, beliefs of an impersonal cosmic force distanced from worldly affairs deism dominate.

Moderate views of God as a personal agent theism; Bader and Palmer, present a being fostering love and not hostility, whereby the image of God is characterized by gracious images e. In contrast, groups that are located at the extreme end of the theological continuum typically view God as a personal agent and embrace names for God that contain an authoritarian image e.

There is evidence that these images of God are consequential. For example, normative beliefs associated with an authoritarian image of God predict more support for capital punishment Bader and Palmer, In addition, an authoritarian conception e. Building on this approach, we propose that variation on the theological dimension of extremism is associated with different behaviors to achieve group goals and to show loyalty to the religious group.

Moderate positions on the theological dimension are indicated by the prominence of gracious images of God and an appreciation of differences in theological beliefs. Conversely, those groups located at the extreme end of the theological continuum, embracing an authoritarian image of God, are more likely to strike at perceived contrary theological beliefs.

For example, we propose that those who believe in an authoritarian, persecuting God will be more likely to believe that natural disasters occur more frequently to groups who live in ways that God disapproves of.

Specific rituals allow for the expression of worship or shared feelings with others Whitehouse and Lanman, , helping to construe notions of religion as a lived experience. Many religious people believe that their religious rituals are guided directly by God. For instance, most Muslims believe that God directs their main rituals including their prayers five times per day.

However, once religion has spread to a wider community, different patterns of rituals may emerge from either local customs or from the integration of religious rituals with local traditions.

This accommodation of new practices can often polarize religious adherents into groups who are either open to new influences, or who reject compromises and see them as forbidden innovations.

In the ritual, children are initiated into Quranic study and adulthood by having a verse written on their hands, which they then ceremoniously lick off, ingesting the verse. We propose that intolerance of diversity in ritual practices distinguishes moderates from extreme religious groups on this dimension. Moderate religion on the ritual dimension is indicated by tolerant views about the influence of local traditions on the way rituals are performed. Moderate groups can accept the influence of tradition within ritual as it is not a compulsory ritual and not directly taught by God.

Conversely, those groups located at the extreme end of the theological continuum are more likely to strive to keep religious rituals pure. This often goes together with vigilance to protect the integrity of rituals, but also with intergroup tension whereby extreme groups accuse more moderate groups of being sinful in their practice. To some extent, the Salafi movement labels the fellow Muslims who perform those rituals as idolatrous Musyrik or even infidels Kafir. The labels, of course, are psychologically painful for the labeled groups of Muslims.

Within the Christian tradition, the Puritan movement is one historical example of ritual extremism, rejecting other Christian denominations as insufficiently pure and compromised by lax tolerance of cultural practices.

The social dimension is concerned with intergroup relations with other groups religious and otherwise as well as intragroup processes, reflected in norms regarding how to interact with others. Extremists on the social dimension typically have a hostile view of other faiths. In their view, out-groups use sinister conspirators as pawns to influence their religious group members Fealy, ; Kohut et al.

As a result, blaming others e. In contrast, more moderate members of a religion often attribute the root causes of in-group problems to internal factors such as anti-intellectual biases, geopolitical instability, and corruption Lackey, Moderate groups also place greater emphasis on the need to change to address modern concerns. Consequently, more moderate groups tend to be more open to collaboration in inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue whereas more extreme religious groups emphasize rejection and avoidance.

Interfaith dialogue is often developed by more moderate religious activists to strengthen inter-religious cooperation as a way to solve common problems e. However, more extreme religious groups often actively reject this collaborative effort, as they perceive inter-religious dialogue as part of a conspiracy to weaken the faith in their religion.

Turning to intragroup relations with other members of the faith community: religion serves as an organizing set of key values that are captured and expressed in group norms. In the context of social relationships, such group norms may vary in the extent to which they tolerate difference and dissent within the religious group.

At times, harsh attitudes toward dissenters and deviants may prevail when universal values of tolerance and group-specific values clash and individuals are forced to follow group-specific values. For instance, because Islam forbids liquors, some Muslims would like to force the government to ban the trade in alcohol, without considering that other groups of people have different norms permitting alcohol consumption Osman, a.

In the context of Indonesia, an active group called the Islamic Defenders Front FPI is one of many aiming to force the entire nation to follow one version of Islamic social norms Arifianto, Hence, the social dimension of religious extremism in our approach is indicated in Indonesia by patterns of externally attributing the causes of in-group disadvantages, and forcing out-groups as well as all in-group members to follow narrow, prescriptive social norms.

Naturally, social and political dimensions of religion will often be inter-related, especially where groups seek political power to impose their socially extreme viewpoint.

However, in distinguishing the two dimensions, we highlight that some groups will be socially extreme without endorsing extreme political views or seeking political power. Groups who expel internal heretics and who shun contact with infidels without trying to dominate them may fall into this category, in our model. As mentioned, the discourse of religious extremism has mostly been related to the political context Fealy, ; Zarkasyi, In an attempt to understand different forms of extremism more comprehensively, we compared these groups on the other three dimensions.

Before outlining our findings, it is important to note that the classification of a particular group as politically extreme was based on specific historical events and developments: by acts of political rebellion by Darul Islam Domain of Islam and Negara Islam Indonesia Indonesian Islamic State in This was also the basis for selecting as extreme the current political movement Hizbut Tahrir and Islamic defender front FPI who have gained support after the reform of Fealy, ; Muhtadi, ; Osman, a.

All groups score high in extremism on the political dimensions in that they demand a comprehensive legalization of sharia , a fully Islamic state, recreation of Caliphate, and the abolition of democracy in Indonesia. For example, the Islamic Defenders Front FPI supports a comprehensive legalization of sharia, but endorses democracy and rejects the revival of the Islamic state and Caliphate Fealy, Another group Laskar Jihad or Jihad Troops demands comprehensive sharia and rejects democracy, but also rejects the revival of the Islamic state and Caliphate.

Both these commonalities and differences have consequences for their relationship with other religious groups and the way they aim to achieve their goals. While we acknowledge the importance of unpacking the political dimension into constituent elements in some cases, our argument is that to fully understand these groups, we also need to explore where these groups stand on the other three dimensions of religious extremism i.

In terms of extremism in the theological dimension, notions about an angry God who uses natural disasters punitively are particularly important to tease the different extremist groups apart. For instance, some Muslim groups in Indonesia claim that ritual celebration of the local tradition in Palu in Central Sulawesi is a main cause of the earthquake and tsunami that hit the Indonesian coast in , killing more than people.

Likewise, such attributions also dominated when explaining the earthquake in Lombok Island Habdan and Baits, These groups emphasized that the earthquake is a punishment from God to show disapproval of the politically different attitudes that are promoted by the political leader of the Island Hasan, Interestingly, such theological beliefs do not lead to a push for change of the political system, but only to an invitation to return to Islamic norms as they understand them.

This shows that an extreme theological belief may not be correlated with extremism on the political dimension. However, extremism in the theological dimension may also be related to a narrow interpretation of jihad as a core principle in Islam.

Most Muslim groups believe that jihad means any zealous effort to bring about a better world Esposito, Theological beliefs restricting the meaning of jihad to waging holy war have an impact on political extremism, in that these can drive believers into intentions to verbally or physically attack the hated out-groups to engage in jihad.

Finally, some groups that are located at the extreme end of the ritual dimension are actively campaigning to purify religious rituals and to suppress local traditions that are perceived as deviating from Islam. For example, some groups such as the Salafi movement and al Wahdah al Islamiyah in Indonesia campaign against local traditions and push for the Muslims to relinquish traditions that are perceived as not taught by the prophet Salman, Importantly though, these movements do not use physical violence in their efforts, and they accept and participate in the political system in Indonesia.

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McCauley, J. Moghadam, A. Casualties in the U. No one can condone or ignore the numbers killed in the U. For example, there were deaths in Europe and all of the Americas between January 1, and July 16, There were 28,—or 43 times more deaths—in other regions—most of them consisting of largely Islamic countries. Almost all of the human impact of extremist attacks is Muslims killing or injuring fellow Muslims.

Seven of the ten countries with the most terrorist attacks in had vast Muslim majorities, and the death and injuries in the other three involve large numbers of Muslim deaths. The vast majority of suicide and vehicle attacks came from "Islamist" extremist groups that killed Muslims in largely Muslim countries.

The fifth section makes it clear that most governments in largely Muslim states are actively moving to suppress religious extremism in their country. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism and Treasury Department lists of designated groups and individuals funding terrorism show both major progress in largely Muslim states in fighting extremism and limiting the funding and support of extremist groups and that much more needs to be done.

At the same time, work by the Pew Trust highlights the fact that many largely Muslim states have placed growing limits on extremist preaching and religious activity. This necessarily interferes with freedom of religion and speech, and given states often exert excessive limits and control, but vague charges that such governments are failing to act do not reflect the real-world actions of many—if not most—governments in largely Muslim states. The sixth section provides a short case state in the dangers of Islamophobia.

Polling data illustrate the degree to which American Muslims show consistent loyalty and support for the U. It also shows that the vast majority of terrorist attacks in the U. The data also show that American Muslims have seen some slight rises in the violent impact of Islamophobia.

The risks of becoming a U. Islamist violence still produces more deaths, but FBI reporting shows that anti-Muslim hate crimes produce higher levels of overall violence, rape, and serious injury. The data and trend charts in the seventh section provide a wide range of metrics showing the other pressures that divide largely Muslim states, and that can drive their populations towards extremism. Each can be a study in itself, but it is clear that many Muslims feel their governments are corrupt and that secular options fail to protect them and provide adequate future opportunities.

Population pressure and corruption are critical factors, as are ethnic and sectarian divisions and hyperurbanization. Youth lack jobs and opportunity in many states, and per capita incomes are sometimes critically low. The eighth section of the report highlights two key factors in dealing with the threat of "Islamist" extremism.

First, almost all of the states with large Muslim majorities have governments that already cooperate with the U. These strategic partnerships are critical to containing the threat and limiting its impact outside the countries where it is now centered. Second, the need for lasting strategic partnerships with Muslim states is reinforced by key demographic trends on a global basis.

Work by the Pew Research Center estimates that the total number of Muslims will increase from 1. Dividing the world on a religious basis, or even seriously alienating a substantial portion of the world's Muslims could create all too real a clash between key elements of the global population and economy.

The trend charts in this section reinforce the points made in the previous sections about the enduring threat that extremism and instability poses to the Islamic world and the state outside it. When they are compared to the previous trend data on incidents and deaths, they show that Al Qaida, ISIS, the Taliban, and the other main targets of today's anti-terrorism and anti-extremist efforts are only a comparatively limited part of even current threats.

The data in this section of this report documents major progress in fighting ISIS and a major joint military effort between a US led coalition and host country allies.